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You Can’t Hurry Love 
WHY ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS FOR 
GAY PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE RELIGIOUS 
EXEMPTIONS 
Andrew Koppelman†
Should those who have religious objections to employing 
gay people or renting them housing be allowed to discriminate?  
There has been a lot of talk lately about a possible conflict 
between gay rights and religious liberty.1  Must there be such a 
conflict? 
Chai Feldblum’s article admirably delineates the high 
moral stakes on both sides.2  As she lucidly shows, many courts 
and commentators have gotten undeserved comfort by 
occluding one horn of the dilemma, and thus making the 
accommodation problem seem easier than it is.  By showing the 
similarities between the felt situation of both sides, Feldblum 
has shown keener perception than most courts that have 
addressed the problem.   
I propose two friendly amendments to Feldblum’s 
analysis. 
First, although Feldblum is correct to stress the burden 
that antidiscrimination laws can place on religious persons who 
object to facilitating homosexual conduct, she is mistaken in 
her legal analysis of this burden.  Under present law, the 
burden does not have constitutional status.  Courts are 
obligated, under the law of some states, to weigh that burden 
 † Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University; Visiting 
Professor of Law, University of Chicago, Spring 2007.  Thanks to Marcia Lehr for 
research assistance, and to Max Schanzenbach and Tobias Wolff for helpful comments. 
 1 See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston: The Coming Conflict 
Between Same-sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, WKLY. STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at 
20; Douglas W. Kmiec, If Gays Marry, Churches Could Suffer, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 
2006, at 27; Judy Peres, Same-sex Marriage Foes Say Religious Liberty at Risk; Others 
Call Fears Greatly Exaggerated, CHI. TRIB., June 5, 2006; Peter Steinfels, Beliefs: 
Advocates on Both Sides of the Same-sex Marriage Issue See a Potential Clash with 
Religious Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2006, at A11. 
 2 See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights 
and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 61 (2006). 
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against the purposes of an antidiscrimination law.  But that 
obligation is not grounded in her novel concept of “belief 
liberty.”  Rather, it rests on a specific obligation to 
accommodate religion.  Feldblum is evidently uncomfortable 
with the decision of so many legislatures and courts to single 
out religion for special treatment.  But her broader concept of 
“belief liberty” is an invitation to chaos, because it would create 
a presumptive right to disobey any law you dislike intensely. 
Second, when she finally performs the actual weighing 
of interests at the end of her article, she is surprisingly 
conclusory.  She argues that religious claims to exemption from 
antidiscrimination laws should almost always be rejected, 
because any act of discrimination is “a deep, intense and 
tangible hurt” that the state has a compelling interest in 
preventing.3  She loses sight, however, of comparable 
intangible burdens felt by conservative Christians.  A more 
precise account of the balance suggests that religious objectors 
should usually be accommodated. 
Part I of this Comment considers the constitutional 
significance of the burden that antidiscrimination laws impose 
on religious objectors.  Part II explains why religious 
exemptions are a sensible way to address America’s cultural 
division over the moral status of homosexuality.  Part III 
examines Harry Blackmun’s ambivalent attitudes toward 
homosexuality, which are described so well by Feldblum, and 
shows why his somewhat equivocal defense of gay rights was 
politically and even normatively appealing because it was 
responsive to that division.  Part IV takes up the problem of 
coexistence within a culture in which citizens have such 
dramatically differing views of sexual ethics.  It concludes that 
Feldblum’s aspiration to create a world in which gay people 
need never fear insult is not an aspiration that law should try 
to enforce, because enforcement would require silencing 
conservative Christians who, like gay people, should be able to 
say what they believe, however distressing that may be to their 
fellow citizens. 
  
 3 Id. at 119. 
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I. THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BURDEN 
Proposing an elaboration of Justice Souter’s concurrence 
in Washington v. Glucksberg,4 Feldblum argues that there 
should be a presumptive immunity, under substantive due 
process, from having to engage in conduct “(or being precluded 
from engaging in certain conduct) [when such compulsion] will 
undermine an individual’s strongly held beliefs.”5  When an 
individual alleges that obeying a given law will “burden[] an 
individual’s beliefs that constitute a core aspect of that 
individual’s sense of self,”6 the courts “should err on the side of 
accepting the person’s allegation.”7  Although all of the claims 
in the cases she discusses were based on religious belief, 
Feldblum is not inclined to single out religion for special 
treatment.  She indicates that she would extend 
accommodation “whether these beliefs are religiously based or 
secularly based.”8
The rule proposed by Feldblum—nowhere stated by 
Souter—is breathtakingly broad.  It is often the case that 
persons who disobey laws disagree with those laws, and 
sometimes they feel those disagreements intensely.  Consider 
John Rapanos, who was so unhappy with environmental 
regulations that prevented him from filling in his wetlands 
that he ultimately defied the law, went to prison, and litigated 
his fines all the way to the Supreme Court.9  Was the state 
constitutionally required to accommodate him, solely on the 
basis of how strongly he felt about it?  There is a virtually 
infinite universe of possible exemption claims here.  Under 
Felblum’s test, the entire population of Southern white racists 
in 1964, who had strong identity-based objections to civil rights 
laws, would have had a presumptive claim to accommodation.  
Unsurprisingly, courts have never adopted a broad exemption 
rule of the kind that Feldblum contemplates. 
She evidently is driven to this extreme position by 
pressure from two sides, her sympathy with some religious 
accommodations and her discomfort with the law’s singling out 
  
 4 Id. at 101 & n.102 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 5 Id. at 103. 
 6 Id. at 105. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Feldblum, supra note 2, at 64; see also id. at 84. 
 9 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214-15 (2006). 
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of religion.  In this she is not alone.  She is only the latest of a 
long series of efforts to salvage religious accommodation under 
some description of what is being accommodated that is 
broader than “religion,” because it seems unfair to single out 
religion for special treatment. 
Her basic approach appears to be to accommodate 
objections to a law when they are felt with particular intensity 
by the objector.  The classic statement of this position is Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh v. United States, which involved 
a draftee who petitioned for conscientious objector status and 
who conscientiously objected to participation in any war, but 
who stated that he did not believe in God and that his beliefs 
were not religious.10  A four-judge plurality in the Supreme 
Court concluded that Welsh’s beliefs were “religious” as that 
term was defined in the pertinent statute.11  What was 
necessary was “that this opposition to war stem from the 
registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is 
right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the 
strength of traditional religious convictions.”12  Justice Harlan, 
concurring in the result, thought that the Court’s removal of 
the statute’s theistic requirement was “a remarkable feat of 
judicial surgery” that was inconsistent with the clear 
intentions of Congress.13  But he joined the result, because he 
thought, as the Court of Appeals had thought in Seeger,14 that 
the law impermissibly discriminated on the basis of religion.15  
If Congress was going to create exemptions, Harlan thought, it 
was constitutionally required to show “equal regard for men of 
nonreligious conscience.”16  “The common denominator must be 
the intensity of moral conviction with which a belief is held.”17  
A dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals below had come to 
the same conclusion, noting that Welsh was “willing to go to 
jail rather than do violence to his beliefs, which is more than 
  
 10 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335-37 (1970). 
 11 Id. at 343-44. 
 12 Id. at 340. 
 13 Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 14 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1964), aff’d, 380 U.S. 
163 (1965). 
 15 Welsh, 398 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 16 Id. at 360 n.12. 
 17 Id. at 358; see also id. at 366 (speculating that the policy of granting 
exemptions is based on “the assumption that beliefs emanating from a religious source 
are probably held with great intensity”). 
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can be said for many who profess a belief in a Supreme 
Being.”18
The problem with the focus on intensity is that it is both 
overinclusive and underinclusive.  It is overinclusive because 
the fact that I am experiencing some intense desire, without 
more, does not state a claim that other people are obligated to 
honor.  It is underinclusive because some religious claims are 
not based on core aspects of a person’s sense of self.  The 
interpretation of the free exercise clause that now prevails does 
not require the state to accommodate religion,19 but it permits 
such accommodation, and the federal government and 
numerous states have accepted the invitation with laws that 
mandate religious accommodation whenever this does not 
conflict with a compelling state interest.20  When religion is 
accommodated, it is accommodated whether or not the 
objector’s core sense of self is implicated.21  Whether Feldblum 
likes it or not, the law presently singles out religion for special 
treatment.22
The potentially breathtaking scope of Feldblum’s 
proposed rule is apparent when one considers her critique of 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. 
(“FAIR”), the case in which the Court rejected the First 
Amendment claims of law schools that wanted to exclude 
military recruiters.23  The schools were doing this because the 
military’s ban on openly gay personnel violated the schools’ 
nondiscrimination policies.24  Feldblum argues that the schools 
(which, incidentally, are not natural persons; it is not apparent 
how an institution can have a core sense of self) thought “that 
law students should be hired without regard to their sexual 
orientation” and that “aiding and abetting any recruiter who 
  
 18 Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1092 (9th Cir. 1968) (Hamley, J., 
dissenting), rev’d, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 19 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). 
 20 For a survey, see Douglas Laycock, Comment, Theology Scholarships, the 
Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the 
Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 210-12 & nn.368-73 (2004). 
 21 I argue this at greater length in Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and 
Religious Exemptions (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 22 For an argument that this is not as unfair as Feldblum appears to think, 
see Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 571. 
 23 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”), 126 
S. Ct. 1297, 1307 (2006). 
 24 Id. at 1302. 
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took sexual orientation into account in hiring was unjust.”25  
This, Feldblum thinks, made out a powerful claim: “Because 
the belief itself related to conduct (i.e., it is unjust to aid and 
abet a discriminatory recruiter), the mandate to engage in 
certain conduct (i.e., treat military recruiters the same as other 
recruiters) necessarily burdened that belief.”26
Feldblum thinks that the Court simply refused to accept 
that the required admission of military recruiters burdened the 
law schools’ expressive beliefs.  But the Court’s opinion took no 
view about whether the schools’ beliefs were burdened.  The 
Court just did not care about that.  It did not suggest that an 
objector to a law ever stated a claim by showing that obedience 
burdened his beliefs. 
Consider the implications of the opposite view.  Federal 
regulations now require cars to have airbags.27  These 
regulations were adopted despite the resistance of automobile 
manufacturers.28  When new cars conspicuously have airbags, 
this is reasonably understood as sending a message that 
(1) airbags are necessary to make cars safe, and (2) their 
inclusion is cost-justified—both propositions from which the 
manufacturer may dissent.  Depending on how strongly the 
manufacturer feels about the matter (and let’s assume a sole 
proprietor, to avoid the problem of corporations having beliefs), 
does the manufacturer not have a powerful argument that his 
expressive beliefs are being burdened?29
The intense preferences of persons are, of course, 
relevant to policymaking.  One ought to accommodate them if 
possible.  But they do not rise to the level of constitutional 
claims. 
One advantage to singling out religion as a basis for 
exemptions is that religious claims are, in their nature, 
available only to those claimants who have a specifically 
religious basis for objecting to obeying a law.  It is a matter of 
  
 25 Feldblum, supra note 2, at 113. 
 26 Id. 
 27 49 U.S.C. § 30127 (2000); 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2005). 
 28 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983). 
 29 Feldblum’s proposal, and more generally the constitutional claim of the law 
schools in FAIR, is thus open to the same objections I have made against a broad 
freedom of expressive liberty.  See Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy 
Scouts of America and the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1819 (2002); see also ANDREW KOPPELMAN AND TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, THE 
BOY SCOUTS, GAY RIGHTS, AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (forthcoming 2007). 
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record that such claims have not arrived in an unmanageable 
flood.30  This does not resolve the question of what to do with 
those claims.  They will be more or less persuasive in a vast 
array of possible situations.31  But at least they will be unusual 
and idiosyncratic, and that fact alone may be relevant to the 
weighing of the accommodation claim.  It is, in fact, relevant to 
the specific question of religious exemptions from 
discrimination laws. 
II. SHOULD THERE BE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROTECTION OF GAY PEOPLE? 
In order to decide whether religious objectors ought to 
be excused from compliance with a law protecting gay people 
from discrimination, we need to consider why there are such 
laws in the first place. 
The general rule, in employment decisions, is that of 
employment at will.  An employer normally has the privilege of 
refusing to hire, or of firing, employees for any reason or no 
reason.  He need not justify these actions to any official.  
Antidiscrimination laws, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
are exceptions to this general rule.  So long as an employer 
does not engage in the enumerated types of discrimination, she 
has the privilege of being as arbitrary as she likes in her 
hiring.  I can, for example, absolutely refuse to hire anyone 
whose eyebrows are not at least three inches long. 
It is important to understand the reasons for the rule of 
employment at will, so that we can understand what we are 
doing when we depart from that rule.  One traditional 
justification is rights-based: people have a right, it is 
sometimes said, to do what they like with their private 
  
 30 See Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec, & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation 
and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 
250 tbl.1 (2004).  In the nine and one-quarter years before Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), held that there is no right to religious exemptions from 
laws of general applicability, there were 310 free exercise claims reported, with a 
success rate of 39.5%.  Id.  In the next three and one-half years, the number of filed 
claims plunged to thirty-eight, and the success rate dropped to 28.4%.  Id.  Under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, which temporarily 
restored the “compelling interest” test (until the Supreme Court struck it down in City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997)), success rates rose to 45.2% and the 
number of filed claims in that three-year period rose to 114, perhaps in response to the 
strong legislative signal that courts should take religious impact very seriously.  Id.  
Even at its peak, this is hardly an overwhelming volume of claims. 
 31 See generally 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS (2006). 
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property.32  The bankruptcy of this justification became clear 
during the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
then-presidential candidate Barry Goldwater opposed on 
libertarian grounds.33  The Civil Rights Act is not an invasion 
of our precious liberties.  On the contrary, it diminishes the 
amount of oppression in the world.  The idea of private 
property is not as sacrosanct as it once was, because the uses of 
that property can have public effects that are legitimate objects 
of legislative concern.  Even Goldwater eventually abandoned 
the libertarian argument and supported antidiscrimination 
protection for gay people.34
The more persuasive justification for the rule of 
employment at will is efficiency-based.  It would be a terrible 
burden on the economy for government officials to have to 
approve every firing, much more every refusal to hire, that 
takes place in the private sector.  Moreover, there is little 
reason to think that most types of arbitrary refusal to hire are 
likely to have much effect on anyone’s opportunities.  Although 
I may refuse to hire anyone whose eyebrows are less than three 
inches long, other employers will compete for the services of the 
short-eyebrowed, and so will bid their wages up to pretty much 
the same level that they would have been if I had been willing 
to hire them.  And the market will also punish me for my 
foolishly discriminatory hiring practices, since competent 
short-eyebrowed workers will go to work for my competitors.  
My tendency to discriminate means that I am turning away 
better workers and hiring worse ones.  The overall tendency is 
for people like me to be driven out of the market. 
Considerations of this sort led Richard Epstein to argue 
that the Civil Rights Act ought to be repealed, because it 
interfered with freedom of contract for no good reason.35  In a 
free market, he argued, we can expect that blacks’ wages (for 
instance) will be as high as they can be.36  Epstein did not 
  
 32 For arguments of this sort, see AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A 
NEW CONCEPT OF EGOISM 126-34 (1964); Michael Levin, Negative Liberty, 2 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 84, 98-100 (1984). 
 33 See RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE 
UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS 363-64 (2001); see also id. at 462 (quoting 
Goldwater speech, co-authored by William Rehnquist, declaring that “the freedom to 
associate means the same thing as the freedom not to associate”). 
 34 See Barry M. Goldwater, The Gay Ban: Just Plain Un-American, WASH. 
POST, June 10, 1993, at A23. 
 35 See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). 
 36 Id. at 28-58. 
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persuade many people.  The point most commonly made by his 
critics was that he had left culture out of his model.  Some 
groups are subject to pervasive discrimination.  At least when 
the Civil Rights Act was enacted, his critics argued, racism was 
sufficiently pervasive to withstand the egalitarian tendencies of 
a well-functioning free market.37  Antidiscrimination law can 
have a powerful effect on economic opportunity.  We know that 
black wages, for instance, went up dramatically after the act 
was passed.  In 1964, the median income of nonwhite males 
was 57% of median white male income.38  By 1985, that ratio 
had risen to 66%.39  The proportion of black men working as 
professionals or managers relative to whites rose from 32% to 
64%.40  And the most dramatic progress came in the first ten 
years after the Act. 
Epstein does not succeed in showing that 
antidiscrimination law should not exist, but he does show why 
the burden is on those who want antidiscrimination law to be 
extended to new classes, and what it is that they need to show.  
Anyone who wants to extend antidiscrimination protection to a 
new class needs to show that the class is subject to 
discrimination that is so pervasive that markets will not solve 
the problem. 
This is not hard to show in the case of lesbians and gay 
men.  The intensity with which gay people have been despised 
in American culture is well documented,41 and good 
scholarship, some of it by Feldblum herself, has now dispelled 
Antonin Scalia’s ignorant claim that all gays “have high 
  
 37 See Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual Liberties in Discriminatory Markets, 
70 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1242-43 (1992) (book review); Symposium, Forbidden Grounds: 
The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1994); 
see also John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1415-19 
(1986) (similarly responding to neoclassical economic attacks on antidiscrimination 
law).  Even those of us who are unpersuaded by Epstein’s claims about racism are 
indebted to his analysis, because the task of responding to him has starkly revealed 
what kind of showing is necessary to make out a prima facie case for intervention in an 
allegedly discriminatory market. 
 38 James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment 
Discrimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 276, 281 (1990). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 60-63 (2006) [hereinafter KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, 
DIFFERENT STATES]; ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 21-25 (2002) [hereinafter KOPPELMAN, THE GAY 
RIGHTS QUESTION]. 
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disposable income.”42  There is plenty of reason to think that 
antigay discrimination is pervasive enough, and has a 
sufficiently severe effect on the economic opportunities of gay 
people, to warrant protection. 
A lot of legislatures have been persuaded by these 
arguments.  In twenty-two states as well as the District of 
Columbia and many municipalities, discrimination against gay 
people is prohibited.43  If these statutes are enforced, then in 
those jurisdictions, overt discrimination against gays will 
become like discrimination against the long-eyebrowed: if it 
happens once in a while, it will not make any economic 
difference.  The preconditions for Epstein’s economic defense of 
a right to discriminate are not always present—that is why his 
general argument against antidiscrimination law is wrong—
but they will be present here. 
And there is every reason to think that religious 
exemptions will not often be sought.  Antigay discrimination is 
now sufficiently stigmatized that a business that openly 
discriminates is likely to pay an economic price for doing so.  
When religious exemptions are available, they are an 
affirmative defense against the enforcement of the law.  The 
defendant charged with discrimination carries the burden of 
pleading, the burden of producing evidence showing that the 
exemption is applicable, and the burden of persuasion.  An 
antidiscrimination law with a religious exemption is nothing at 
all like a regime with no such law.44  The difficulties should not 
be exaggerated; conspicuously religious discriminators are so 
likely to prevail in their defenses that they are unlikely to be 
sued in the first place.  But there are unlikely to be huge 
  
 42 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  See M.V. 
LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND 
GAY MEN 128-132 (2001); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997: Hearing of the 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources on S. 869 to Prohibit Employment 
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 105th Cong. 46-49 (1998) (statement 
of Chai R. Feldblum, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). 
 43 See Lambda Legal, Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which 
Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/news/resources.html?record=217 (last visited October 4, 2006). 
 44 This was emphasized in an amicus brief by the Christian Legal Society in 
Romer v. Evans, which argued that this burden on the religious constituted a 
compelling reason to abolish all antidiscrimination protection for gay people.  Brief for 
Christian Legal Society as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008428.  This argument proves far too much.  
It would argue for the abolition of all laws to which some religious persons have 
objections (which probably means, all laws). 
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numbers of them, at least in most parts of most jurisdictions 
that protect gay people from discrimination. 
This is perhaps why Feldblum ignores the economic 
rationale for antidiscrimination protection.  Her concern about 
antigay discrimination is not, ultimately, economic.  It is more 
precisely dignitary. 
Ensuring that LGBT people can live lives of honesty and safety in all 
aspects of their social lives requires that society set a baseline of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender 
identity.  If individual business owners, service providers and 
employers could easily exempt themselves from such laws by making 
credible claims that their belief liberty is burdened by the law, LGBT 
people would remain constantly vulnerable to surprise 
discrimination.  If I am denied a job, an apartment, a room at a 
hotel, a table at a restaurant or a procedure by a doctor because I am 
a lesbian, that is a deep, intense and tangible hurt.  That hurt is not 
alleviated because I might be able to go down the street and get a 
job, an apartment, a hotel room, a restaurant table or a medical 
procedure from someone else.  The assault to my dignity and my 
sense of safety in the world occurs when the initial denial happens. 
That assault is not mitigated by the fact that others might not treat 
me in the same way.45
There is something odd about this passage.  The 
parallels between the burden on gay people and the burden on 
Christians, so nicely drawn at the beginning of the article, have 
entirely disappeared.  What about the right of conservative 
Christians to “live lives of honesty?”  If they are “constantly 
vulnerable” to forced association with gay people, will this not 
be “a deep, intense and tangible hurt” to them? 
The great attraction of regulation-plus-exemptions is 
that it lowers the stakes and makes possible a legislative 
compromise that does not threaten the deepest interests on 
either side.  Feldblum even acknowledges this; she is willing to 
consider exemptions as part of a legislative compromise “in a 
negotiated setting with those whose beliefs will be adversely 
impacted by the law.”46  But put that way, it appears simply as 
a tactical concession, with no principled underpinning.  The 
case for exemptions is stronger than that. 
The burden of complying with antidiscrimination rules 
has become one of the premier concerns of conservative 
Christians, who tend to understand their opposition to gay 
rights to be defensive in nature.  They have been collecting 
  
 45 Feldblum, supra note 2, at 119. 
 46 Id. at 116. 
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horror stories which, they argue, show that gay rights are a 
threat to religious liberty.47  Reasonable gay rights proponents 
should take these concerns seriously and seek to accommodate 
them where this is possible—not just because it is politically 
sensible (though it is), but because it is the right thing to do. 
Feldblum claims that gay people are hurt by even one 
instance of discrimination.  They are entitled never to have 
that happen to them, ever.  But this is not precisely an 
argument.  It is an assertion.  Just why should this right be 
construed in this way, rather than more modestly? 
Feldblum here does not seem quite to have the courage 
of her convictions, because she silently puts her thumb on the 
nondiscrimination side of the scales.  Just how is the ability of 
gay people “to live lives of honesty and safety”48 jeopardized by 
the occasional discriminator?  There has, of course, been 
ubiquitous violence against gays and the law needs to suppress 
that,49 but the discriminator proposes to exclude gay people, not 
beat them up.  In the story with which her paper begins, a 
guesthouse owner unfairly surprises a gay wedded couple by 
forbidding them to sleep together.50  But, of course, 
discrimination is one thing and unfair surprise is another.51  
The unfair surprise is a cheat.  It has nothing to do with the 
discrimination question. 
Feldblum’s position becomes even more puzzling when 
she concedes that she can tolerate discrimination in a very 
  
 47 See, e.g., JANET L. FOLGER, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF CHRISTIANITY (2005); 
ALAN SEARS & CRAIG OSTEN, THE HOMOSEXUAL AGENDA: EXPOSING THE PRINCIPAL 
THREAT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM TODAY (2003); Robert H. Knight, The Corporate 
Curtain: How Companies Are Using Views on Homosexuality to Punish their Christian 
Employees, Concerned Women for America, Jan. 20, 2006, http://www.cwfa.org/ 
articledisplay.asp?id=9808&department=CFI&categoryid=papers; Douglas W. Kmiec, 
Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Anti-Discrimination Campaigns Against Religion, 
Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.becketfund.org/files/3edbb.pdf. 
 48 Feldblum, supra note 2, at 76. 
 49 See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 
1462-70 (1992). 
 50 Feldblum, supra note 2, at 61-62. 
 51 In her hypothetical, Feldblum states that the gay couple made a 
reservation.  It is an interesting question whether the guesthouse owner is liable for 
breach of contract.  Courts normally fill in unspecified contract terms by reference to 
ordinary usage and reasonable expectations.  In a state where there is an 
antidiscrimination statute, from which the owner claims a religious exemption, the 
burden is likely to be on the owner to tell those making reservations that, unlike 
almost all other hoteliers in the state, he deviates from the ordinary usage and custom.  
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.13, at 483-86 (3d ed. 1999).  An owner who 
waits to state his objections until after travelers have arrived is not likely to get much 
sympathy from the courts, even if the law allows a religious exemption.  Thanks to 
Richard Speidel for helpful discussion of this example. 
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narrow set of cases: “enterprises that are engaged in by 
communities of faith (almost always religious communities) 
that are specifically designed to inculcate values in the next 
generation” and that “seek to enroll only individuals who wish 
to be inculcated with such beliefs.”52  Gay people (with the 
important exception of adolescents in conservative Christian 
families) are unlikely ever to encounter such enterprises.  
Apparently, antigay beliefs, and actions based on those beliefs, 
are acceptable so long as they remain deeply closeted. 
What Feldblum really wants is full social acceptance for 
gay people.  She wants them to be free from a certain kind of 
insult.  There can be discriminatory entities out there, but she 
does not want to hear about them.  In the hypothetical with 
which she begins, her wedded couple would be unjustly injured 
even if the guesthouse’s web homepage clearly indicated that it 
turns away unmarried and gay couples. 
Now, it is possible to bring that about in the long run.  
Social change can sometimes be as complete as that.  My father 
told me about getting beaten up on the way to school because 
he was Jewish.  The last time I was so much as subjected to an 
anti-Semitic remark was decades ago. 
But that is not the state of contemporary American 
society with respect to homosexuality.  Many Americans 
continue to hold the second of the three views Feldblum 
describes, that gay sexuality is not good, but not intrinsically 
evil either.  Their reaction to homosexuality is not the “we love 
you” that she eventually elicited from Justice Blackmun.  It is 
“we love you anyway.”  Though Feldblum does not disaggregate 
further, this second view comes in different varieties.  Some 
people regard homosexuality as a kind of handicap, morally 
neutral but unfortunate inasmuch as it makes it impossible to 
create children through ordinary (and relatively inexpensive!) 
biological processes.53  Others regard it as a moral failing, but a 
venial one.  And of course all of these views frequently coexist 
in the same people, in an incoherent bricolage.  Justice 
Blackmun’s ambivalence, which Feldblum describes so 
tellingly, is not atypical. 
  
 52 Feldblum, supra note 2, at 121. 
 53 Those who think so include some gay people.  See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, 
Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261, 269-70 (1995).  On the 
other hand, for many, the ability to have sex without worrying about pregnancy is a 
positive good. 
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For just that reason, however, Blackmun’s ambivalent 
response may have been just what was needed in Blackmun’s 
time. 
III. THE VIRTUES OF JUSTICE BLACKMUN’S AMBIVALENCE 
As Feldblum emphasizes, Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers 
v. Hardwick says “there may be many ‘right’ ways of 
conducting [intimate sexual] relationships.”54  But Blackmun 
puts “right” in scare quotes (and says “may be” not “are”), and 
so ends up being agnostic as between the love you/love you 
anyway positions.55  Feldblum in effect proposes to take off the 
scare quotes, as Blackmun himself did (or at least tried to do) 
in their conversation. 
She has argued elsewhere that we ought to reject liberal 
neutrality and make our moral judgments about homosexual 
conduct clear on their face.56  The basis of gay rights should not 
be “we love you anyway”; it should be “we love you.”  Others 
have criticized the kind of approach Blackmun makes in 
Hardwick on similar grounds.  Thus, for example, Michael 
Sandel objects that “the toleration [Blackmun’s dissent] 
defended was wholly independent of the value or importance of 
the thing being tolerated.”57
But there is reason to leave the law ambiguous on 
certain issues.  The law must sometimes reckon with the 
  
 54 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 
quoted in Feldblum, supra note 2, at 67. 
 55 The scare quotes are, of course, borrowed from Burger’s Yoder opinion, 
which Blackmun quotes.  Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 206 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972)).  But Burger does not really mean to be agnostic.  It’s clear 
that he loves the Amish and wishes that more Americans were like them: hardworking, 
abstemious, and deferential to authority. 
 56 See generally Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Civil Rights Bill: From 
Bella to ENDA, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
149 (John D’Emilio, William B. Turner & Urvashi Vaid eds., 2000); Chai R. Feldblum, 
Gay is Good: The Moral Case for Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 139 (2005); Chai R. Feldblum, The Limitations of Liberal Neutrality 
Arguments in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX 
PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (Robert 
Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001); Chai R. Feldblum, Response, The Moral 
Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992 (1997); Chai R. Feldblum, A Progressive 
Moral Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 485 (1998); Chai 
R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 237 (1996). 
 57 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 106 (1996).  Sandel is here critiquing the vision of toleration set 
forth in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), but he argues that precisely the same 
vision animates Blackmun’s dissent in Hardwick.  See id. at 103-108. 
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problem posed by John Rawls: “[H]ow is it possible for there to 
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal 
citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”58  Rawls thinks 
that the answer has to be an idea of public reason that can be 
the basis for an overlapping consensus.  As the poll data that 
Feldblum cites indicates, homosexuality is one of those issues 
about which we are likely to remain profoundly divided for 
some time to come. 
Two bits of data suggest the wisdom of the kind of 
bracketing of moral issues that Blackmun’s dissent undertook.  
A Gallup poll conducted a few days after Hardwick came down 
found that, by 57% to 34%, Americans thought states should 
not “have the right to prohibit particular sexual practices 
conducted in private between consenting adult homosexuals.”59  
On the other hand, in 1986, more than 70% of Americans 
thought that homosexual sex was always wrong (The number 
remains a bit above 50%).60
Blackmun’s take in Hardwick is theoretically messy for 
all the reasons rehearsed most prominently by Robert Bork.  In 
a well-known article published in 1971, Bork objects that the 
Court’s choice of the level at which to define the right to 
privacy was necessarily arbitrary. Griswold v. Connecticut61 
certainly did not adopt the very broad principle that 
“government may not interfere with any acts done in private,” 
but it is hard to explain why the principle should be defined 
narrowly, as “government may not prohibit the use of 
contraceptives by married couples.”62
Why does the principle extend only to married couples?  Why, out of 
all forms of sexual behavior, only to the use of contraceptives?  Why, 
out of all forms of behavior, only to sex? . . . 
To put the matter another way, if a neutral judge must demonstrate 
why principle X applies to cases A and B but not to case C . . . , he 
must, by the same token, also explain why the principle is defined as 
  
 58 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4 (rev. paperback ed. 1996). 
 59 JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND 
LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 332 (2001). 
 60 MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR?: THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED 
AMERICA 85 (2005). 
 61 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 62 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1, 7 (1971). 
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X rather than X minus, which would cover A but not cases B and C, 
or as X plus, which would cover all cases, A, B, and C.63
Thus, Bork argues, there is no principled way to distinguish 
the economic liberty at issue in Lochner from the sexual liberty 
at issue in Griswold.64  In each case, those whose conduct is 
restricted by the law would prefer to be unburdened by the 
restriction, while the majority has a different preference. 
Bork’s critique is theoretically powerful.  No particular 
privacy interest is derivable from first principles, because those 
principles do not entail any particular public/private line.65  
The vagueness of the privacy right opens the door for arbitrary 
and idiosyncratic line-drawing, such as Blackmun’s strange 
fixation on the rights of doctors in Roe v. Wade.66
And Blackmun does not really answer Bork, either in 
Roe or in Hardwick.67  His defense of decisional privacy does 
not satisfactorily distinguish abortion and fornication.  His idea 
of spatial privacy, based on the Stanley v. Georgia principle 
protecting private possession of obscenity,68 does not explain 
why illegal drugs and prostitution are not likewise protected.  
All Blackmun has to go on is an intuition that noncommercial, 
consensual sexual conduct in the home should be outside the 
state’s power. 
Happily for Blackmun, though, that intuition is very 
widely shared.  The virtue of the intuition is that it abstracts 
away from the evaluative question, where many people’s views 
are much less friendly to gay people.  Its vice is precisely the 
same.  Sandel complains that “the analogy with Stanley 
tolerates homosexuality at the price of demeaning it; it puts 
homosexual intimacy on a par with obscenity—a base thing 
that should nonetheless be tolerated so long as it takes place in 
private.”69  But it is precisely this neutrality that made it 
possible for Blackmun’s reasoning to have such broad appeal. 
  
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 11-12 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479 (1965) and 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 65 See KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION, supra note 41, at 35-52. 
 66 410 U.S. 113, 125-27 (1973).  
 67 He did better in his later abortion opinions, where he placed less weight on 
the substantive due process argument and placed more emphasis on women’s equality.  
See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME 
COURT JOURNEY 222-27 (2005). 
 68 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
 69 SANDEL, supra note 57, at 107. 
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Feldblum is skeptical of neutrality.  But neutrality 
takes many forms.  The political ideal of neutrality toward 
conceptions of the good is unsustainable at the extremely 
abstract level proposed by some liberal theorists: the state 
cannot really be neutral toward all controversial conceptions of 
the good.  Neutrality is nonetheless a valuable political ideal.  
One of the many ways that government can go wrong is to take 
a position on some question that it would, all things considered, 
be better for it to abstain from deciding.  The classic example is 
the question of which (if any) religion is true.  The idea of 
neutrality holds that government ought to avoid this pathology.  
There is probably an infinite number of ways in which the field 
of abstinence might be specified, and so there is a lush 
profusion of possible neutralities.  With any particular issue, 
the question is whether government ought to be neutral with 
respect to that question.70
With the “we love you/we love you anyway” problem, 
there is some value in the Court not taking sides, because it 
has no special expertise in deciding the intrinsic value or lack 
thereof of homosexual relationships.  This is not a question of 
law at all.  It is not the job of a court to tell the rest of us what 
to value.  Imagine a court deciding whether the extinction of 
endangered species is really something that should bother us.71
What courts can and should do is enforce the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Blackmun did not reach the Equal 
Protection issue in Hardwick, but, as Linda Greenhouse shows, 
his understanding of privacy, at least with respect to the core 
issue (for him) of abortion, became increasingly inflected with 
equality concerns.72  Blackmun was no longer on the Court 
when it decided Romer v. Evans,73 but it follows his lead in 
avoiding any resolution of moral questions. 
The question after Romer that a court must decide in 
any particular case of antigay discrimination is whether a law 
reflects a bare desire to harm an unpopular group.  This is 
Ely’s notion of prejudice.  As John Hart Ely pointed out long 
ago, “a sincerely held moral objection to the act” of homosexual 
  
 70 The argument of this paragraph is developed in detail in Andrew 
Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. OF POL. 633 (2004). 
 71 But for an argument that the Court is coming dangerously close to doing 
this, see Andrew Koppelman and David Dana, Clean Water is Symbol of the Power of 
the People, S.F. CHRON., July 23, 2006, at E-3.
 72 See GREENHOUSE, supra note 67. 
 73 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
142 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
sex is not per se the same thing as “a simple desire to injure the 
parties involved.”74  Romer asks whether any particular law 
reflects a bare desire to harm an unpopular group.75
Lawrence v. Texas takes no position on the morality of 
homosexual conduct when it holds that gay people “are entitled 
to respect for their private lives.”76  This is just Stanley again.  
What modern doctrine asks courts to do is to try to decide 
which is doing the work in any particular statute that burdens 
gay people.  It does not deem moral objections illegitimate.  It 
simply holds that, if a state singles out gays for unprecedentedly 
harsh treatment, the Court will presume that what is going on is a 
bare desire to harm, rather than mere moral disapproval.77
The Romer/Lawrence approach shares the virtue of 
Blackmun’s Hardwick dissent in that it abstracts away from 
the precise questions that Feldblum would like the courts to 
take a stand on.  So it avoids the messiness of substantive due 
process, but it preserves the value of abstraction that 
Blackmun wanted to pursue.  That is a virtue.  Blackmun is to 
be praised for doing the precise thing that troubles Feldblum. 
IV. INTENDED TO BE HURTFUL 
Let us return to the question of religious exemptions.  
How should that question be resolved if the state is not going to 
take sides on the moral value of homosexuality? 
It is possible for gay people and conservative Christians 
to live together, each following their own deepest allegiances.  
But the coexistence that this entails will necessarily be painful 
for both.  The only way to achieve comfort for either would be to 
make the other disappear or pretend to disappear.  Because 
that is not appropriate, there is no good way to prevent the 
kind of hurt that Feldblum wants to prevent. 
There will be times when it is indeed necessary to 
silence one of the parties to this dispute: when there is a 
  
 74 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 256 n.92 (1980). 
 75 See 517 U.S. at 634-35 (“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.” (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534 (1973))). 
 76 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2004). 
 77 This interpretation of Lawrence is elaborated and defended in Andrew 
Koppelman, Lawrence’s Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (2004).  For a state Supreme 
Court decision adopting a similar reading of Lawrence, see Kansas v. Limon, 122 P.3d 
22 (Kan. 2005). 
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likelihood that the speech will involve an abuse of power,78 or 
when there is an unusually vulnerable audience.79  But when 
neither of these is present, the law, and more generally those 
wielding power in our society, should try to contain the tension 
between the two views, rather than trying to silence either. 
The difficulty of achieving such coexistence is starkly 
presented in Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., in which the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a claim 
of religious discrimination.80
Richard Peterson had been an employee of Hewlett-
Packard’s office in Boise, Idaho for more than twenty years 
when his dispute with his employer arose.81  The company, as 
part of a workplace diversity campaign, began displaying 
“diversity posters” that included supportive descriptions of the 
company’s gay workers.82  Peterson, who described himself as a 
“devout Christian,” thought that he had a duty “to expose evil 
when confronted with sin.”83  He responded to the posters by 
placing biblical verses on an overhead bin in his work cubicle, 
in type large enough to be visible to passersby, which included 
coworkers and customers.84  Among these was the following 
passage from Leviticus 20:13: “If a man also lie with mankind, 
as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an 
abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall 
be put upon them.”85
Hewlett-Packard had an anti-harassment policy that 
prohibited “[a]ny comments or conduct relating to a 
person’s . . . sexual orientation . . . that fail to respect the 
dignity and feeling [sic] of the individual.”86  Peterson’s 
supervisor removed the materials from his cubicle, and in the 
next several days he attended a series of meetings with 
  
 78 See, e.g., Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying 
religious discrimination claim of conservative Christian supervisor fired after 
harassing and intimidating openly gay subordinate). 
 79 See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified School Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 
2006), reh’g en banc denied, 455 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006) (student barred from 
wearing T-shirt saying “homosexuality is shameful”).  But see Eugene Volokh, Sorry, 
Your Viewpoint is Excluded from First Amendment Protection, Apr. 20, 2006, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1145577196.shtml. 
 80 Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 81 Id. at 601. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 601-02. 
 85 Id. (quoting Leviticus 20:13).  
 86 Peterson, 358 F.3d at 602. 
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managers.87  The Biblical passages, he explained, were 
“intended to be hurtful. And the reason [they were] intended to 
be hurtful is you cannot have correction unless people are faced 
with truth.”88  He expressed his hope that gay co-workers who 
read the passages “would repent (change their actions) and 
experience the joys of being saved.”89
Peterson refused to take down his Bible verses unless 
Hewlett-Packard took down its posters.90  Hewlett-Packard 
gave him time off with pay to reconsider his position, but when 
he returned to work, he posted the verses again and refused to 
remove them.91  He was fired for insubordination.92  His suit for 
religious discrimination was rejected on summary judgment in 
federal district court.93  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.94
As a legal matter, the courts certainly got it right: 
Peterson was not subjected to discrimination on the basis of 
religion, and Hewlett-Packard had the right to fire him.  And 
yet, I wonder whether firing him was the most appropriate 
course of action for Hewlett-Packard.  In light of its diversity 
campaign, Peterson was obviously an outlier, someone whose 
views did not represent those of the company.  Judge 
Reinhardt, writing for the Ninth Circuit, placed considerable 
weight on “Peterson’s intention that his postings be ‘hurtful,’”95 
and concluded that an employer need not “permit an employee 
to post messages intended to demean and harass his co-
workers.”96
Circuit Judge Reinhardt’s view is far too conclusory.  He 
presumes that it is never appropriate, in civil society, for 
someone to say things that he knows to be hurtful to others.97  
But this conclusion is morally and politically loaded.  It 
  
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 604. 
 90 Id. at 602. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Peterson, 358 F.3d at 602. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. at 608. 
 95 Id. at 604 n.3. 
 96 Id. at 607. 
 97 And on this basis, he suggests that Hewlett-Packard may have had an 
obligation, under the law of workplace harassment, to silence Peterson.  This surely 
goes too far.  Harassment law, thus broadly construed, would run afoul of the First 
Amendment.  See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL 
EQUALITY 248-55 (1996). 
2006] YOU CAN'T HURRY LOVE 145 
presumes that none of us need to hear things that will hurt 
us.98
Reinhart’s argument draws its power from the analogy 
with racism: people should not be subjected to ideologies that 
demean them.99  In the same way that racism has no legitimate 
place in the public sphere, one might think that heterosexism 
should be eradicated.100  There is a powerful case to be made for 
the eradication of racism, to the extent that this can be done 
consistently with free speech guarantees101—and of course such 
guarantees do not apply in the workplace.  The First 
Amendment does not protect you from being fired for your 
opinions.  But the gay rights issue is different.  The racism 
analogy has some power; much of the antigay animus that 
exists in the United States is just like racism, in the virulence 
of the rage it bespeaks and the hatred that it directs toward 
those who are its objects.  Not all antigay views, however, deny 
the personhood and equal citizenship of gay people.102  
Certainly Peterson’s views did not do that.  There is a serious 
discussion to be had here about sexuality and morality.  
Peterson’s views do not place him beyond the pale of civilized 
discussion. 
It is a disputed question whether the specific hurtful 
things that Peterson had to say were sound enough to be worth 
hearing.  It is a question about which the state properly ought 
to be agnostic.  Our society’s most basic moral traditions are 
deeply divided about the proper answer to that question.  We 
need to keep talking about it.  The conversation is not always a 
pleasant experience.  And it is fragile.  It will shut down if 
either side uses its power to coerce the other to shut up.  Gay 
people have been for a long time, and sometimes still are, 
subjected to just this kind of silencing. 
  
 98 On the value of the moral distress caused by exposure to strange and 
hateful ideas, see Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to 
Brandeis to the Present, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61 
(Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, eds., 2002); Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value 
of Moral Distress, 35 POL. STUD. 310 (1987). 
 99 He presses the analogy in his majority opinion in Harper, 445 F.3d at 1181. 
 100 I made this claim in Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality, supra 
note 97, but I now think that I did not adequately deal with the complication that I am 
describing here. 
 101 This case is made at length in Antidiscrimination Law and Social 
Equality, supra note 97. 
 102 See KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION, supra note 41, at 17-19; 
KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES, supra note 41, at 53-68. 
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Hewlett-Packard had enormous leverage over Peterson.  
It is not a light thing to fire someone from a job he has held for 
20 years.  This is the kind of sanction that is likely to drive 
dissenters into the closet.  And, as gay people know so well, the 
closet is not a healthy place to be. 
CONCLUSION 
Feldblum is correct that we should directly engage in 
moral argumentation about the gay rights question.  There is a 
correct answer to the question of how gay relationships ought 
to be valued, and she and I agree about what that answer is.103  
But our conclusion should not be imposed on everyone else by 
the courts.  Slower and more cumbersome processes are 
needed.  You can’t hurry love.104
  
 103 See KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION, supra note 41, at 79-93; 
Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 5 (2004); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 
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 104 See THE SUPREMES, You Can’t Hurry Love, on SUPREMES A’ GO-GO 
(Motown Records 1966). 
